A Study on the Experimental Methods of the Power Analysis Attack in a Smartcard 


Vol. 27,  No. 6, pp. 540-548, Jun.  2002


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  Abstract

Attacks have been proposed that use side information as timing measurements, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions and faulty hardware. Elimination side-channel information or prevention it from being used to attack a secure system is an active ares of research. In this paper, differential power analysis techniques to attack the DES are experimented and analyzed. And we propose the prevention of DPA attack by software implementation technique.

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  Cite this article

[IEEE Style]

H. Lee, I. Jang, H. Choi, I. Park, "A Study on the Experimental Methods of the Power Analysis Attack in a Smartcard," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 540-548, 2002. DOI: .

[ACM Style]

HoonJae Lee, Ick-Hoon Jang, Hee-Bong Choi, and Il-Hwan Park. 2002. A Study on the Experimental Methods of the Power Analysis Attack in a Smartcard. The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, 27, 6, (2002), 540-548. DOI: .

[KICS Style]

HoonJae Lee, Ick-Hoon Jang, Hee-Bong Choi, Il-Hwan Park, "A Study on the Experimental Methods of the Power Analysis Attack in a Smartcard," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 540-548, 6. 2002.