Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Charging and Optimal Regulation Under Customer Ignorance 


Vol. 31,  No. 12, pp. 1112-1121, Dec.  2006


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  Abstract

This Paper deals with the model of fixed-mobile interconnection. Specifically, how interconnection charge and originating price are determined when there is customer ignorance about terminating network or the price. This paper shows that the terminating charge with customer ignorance is higher than without that, and therefore the retail price becomes higher. This paper discusses the several methods to prevent the increase of the retail price and suggests the scheme to regulate the retail price and interconnection charge, simultaneously.

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  Cite this article

[IEEE Style]

C. Y. Jung, "Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Charging and Optimal Regulation Under Customer Ignorance," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 31, no. 12, pp. 1112-1121, 2006. DOI: .

[ACM Style]

Choong Young Jung. 2006. Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Charging and Optimal Regulation Under Customer Ignorance. The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, 31, 12, (2006), 1112-1121. DOI: .

[KICS Style]

Choong Young Jung, "Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Charging and Optimal Regulation Under Customer Ignorance," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 31, no. 12, pp. 1112-1121, 12. 2006.

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pISSN : 1226 - 4717
eISSN : 2287 - 3880