Security Analysis and Enhancement of Tsai et al.'s Smart-Card Based Authentication Scheme 


Vol. 39,  No. 1, pp. 29-37, Jan.  2014


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  Abstract

In this paper we show that a dynamic ID authentication scheme using smart cards proposed by Tsai et al. is not secure against DoS attack and insider attack. Further we claim that their scheme may raise a security problem when a user changes his/her password. Then we come up with a security-enhanced version only with small additional computational cost. Our scheme is based on the security of cryptographic hash function and the infeasibility assumption of discrete logarithm problem. In addition, we provide details of security and computational cost analysis.

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  Cite this article

[IEEE Style]

M. Kim, "Security Analysis and Enhancement of Tsai et al.'s Smart-Card Based Authentication Scheme," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 29-37, 2014. DOI: .

[ACM Style]

Myungsun Kim. 2014. Security Analysis and Enhancement of Tsai et al.'s Smart-Card Based Authentication Scheme. The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, 39, 1, (2014), 29-37. DOI: .

[KICS Style]

Myungsun Kim, "Security Analysis and Enhancement of Tsai et al.'s Smart-Card Based Authentication Scheme," The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 29-37, 1. 2014.